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OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant Tolman objects to Respondent's recitation
of the facts in that it mischaracterizes and editorializes the
testimony presented at trial.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of

breathing life into a cold trial record, several references to
the evidence are flatly misstated,
1.

Trial exhibit seven does not refer to Jim Ashby's

"favorable" report.

Nor did any of the witness statements cited

characterize Ashby's report as "favorable".
2.

Harman may have told Tolman something about Trial

Exhibit eight, but he certainly-did not tell him to do all of the
things referenced.

Appellant objects to the use of the

conjunctive "and" and also the term "one-page short report".

No

one testified to that, not even Sam Dawson who cannot recall
which, if either, term "short" or "one-page" was used.
3.

Respondent ignores the testimony of several wit-

nesses and draws conclusions which are not consistent with
evidence.
a.

No one testifies that Tolman gave Larsen the

seven-page report, but merely that Murray Fire received a courtesy copy.
b.

Larsen disavowed ever having a copy of the report.

(See Appellant's Brief, footnote 13.)
c.

Tolman, while referencing the terras "destroy", "get

rid of", "paper the walls with", "eat", and "deep six", never

tells Larsen to physically destroy the report but to keep it in
case there was a further court action.
4.

(R. 532 T. 1256-58.)

Sam Dawson does not state in his testimony that the

second report was "quickly" approved, and Respondent's observation of the evidence is strictly editorial.
ARGUMENT
POINT II
In response to Respondent's Point II Part A., Appellants would refer this Court to a closer reading of In the Matter
of a Criminal Investigation, 79 UAR 3 (Ut. S.Ct., March 31,
1988).

In his opinion, Mr. Justice

Zimmerman examines the

holding in State v. Ruggeri, 19 U.2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967).
At footnotes 17 and 18, he specifically finds that Ruggeri
establishes notice requirements which are consistent with Appellant's previous argument.

Moreover, those requirements were not

met in this case and this matter should be reversed for that
reason above.
Regarding Respondent's argument to Point II Part C ,
Appellant's Brief contains all which Respondent is unable to
find.

Paragraph six of the Statement of the Case and footnote 10

concisely express the issue regarding Christensen1s testimony
which was excluded due to court error.
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POINT IV
THE INCLUSION OF "GOD" IN JURY DELIBERATIONS
WAS IMPROPER IN THIS INSTANCE AS
WAS THE USE OF A DICTIONARY
A.

DICTIONARY

Respondent points out that the record before this Court
is silent regarding the jury's use of a dictionary during deliberations*

(Brief of Respondent, p„ 40.)

However, Respondent

does not deny that fact because Respondent knew and now knows of
its occurrence.

Appellant was the only participant without

knowledge of that fact, not learning of same until after the
Notice of Appeal herein was filed.
It follows that Appellant cannot tell this Court the
extent of use of the dictionary by the jury since, (1) he is
precluded from supplementing the record to even point out the
fact of its use and, (2) had no opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing to ask the jurors about its extent.
If this Court forecloses this issue then it also opens
the door for courts and/or prosecutors to preclude introduction
of virtually any potentially prejudicial error which is hidden
from defendants, ex parte, until after transmission of the record
on appeal.

The interests of justice require an evidentiary

hearing on this issue.
B.

GOD

Respondent declares that State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1236, 1246 (Utah 1988), precludes judicial review of this issue
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as being a probe into the theological debate over the very
existence of Godc

(R. Brief, p. 39.)

Respondent misses the

substance of the issue.
God's existence has no significance to this argument.
That six jurors relied on answers to prayer which they believe
were supplied by an existing God of mutual perception jjs significant.

Whether or not they were influenced by fantasy or reality

is not the issue.

The issues are, were the answers to the prayer

"extraneous prejudicial information" or "outside influence"?
If the perceived communications from God went to the
ultimate question of guilt, as alleged, then the result is
undeniably "prejudicial".
Therefore, was it "extraneous"?

Since "God" was not a

witness subject to cross-examination, his (or her or it's)
opinion is "extraneous" testimony and should not have been
considered.
The "outside influence" question is even more profound.
It is not just a question of God taking part in deliberations
within the real or imagined context of the participating jurors'
prayerful conduct, it must be viewed as the direct insertion of
authority, (i.e., influence), outside and beyond the charge of
the court and the presentation of evidence.

It strikes at the

heart of the constitutional prohibitions against the merger of
church and state.
This is not a case of faith in a common God which
results in perceived guidance? it is a case of submission to
-4-

religious authority pursuant to the laws of a common religion.
It is not guidance so much as it is the following of orders.
The recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State
v. DeMille is cited by respondent as being dispositive of this
issue.

83 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (May 26, 1988).

(Respondent's

Brief, p. 39.)
The case is clearly distinguishable.

In DeMille, one

juror held a private prayer "during closing argument" then later
professed her belief of guilt, (derived by divine revelation),
during deliberation.

"At most, it suggests that one juror may

have been personally influenced by her own 'revelation,1 and that
she told others of her experience as one means of (persuasion)."
Id. at p. 8.
In this case, three-fourths of the jury, (previously
committed to acquittal based upon the evidence), agreed to submit
the ultimate verdict, en masse, to the divine answer to a prayer
by one of its members, who would (and did) communicate his
revelation to the others.
In his dissent in DeMille, Justice Stewart's fears of
this very scenario were realized.
"Verdicts based on chance . . . (are) subject
to challenge . . . Thus, if jurors were to
agree that a verdict would be based on a
"divine sign" (rather than the evidence) . .
. (the right to due process and a jury trial
would be denied.)" At p. 9.
Justice Stewart's dissent states that verdicts need be
based on the evidence and law it receives, not on "God's judg-
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ment" which is a "throw-back" to "trial by ordeal".

He differ-

entiates between divine guidance in assessing the evidence
(permissible) and guidance regarding the actual verdict,

(Id. at

p. 9.)
The dissent also places great import on the "divinely
inspired" DeMille juror's leadership role as effecting the degree
of influence.

(Id, at p. 10.)

This case is a classic example of

the scenario Justice Stewart feared.

The prayer leader exerted

the power of the "priesthood" in cementing the influence of his
revelation.
The majority opinion in DeMille would also support
Appellant's claim of misconduct.

DeMille holds that the indi-

vidual (not group) prayer of a juror (not a jury) is part of the
personal decision process so long as the juror is "capable of
fairly weighing the evidence".

(Id, at p. 8.)

The fate of

Appellant ceased to become personal in this case when the
"priesthood" replaced the evidence and the law.

Six personal

decisions became a lock-step block of six subjected to an outside
authority.
Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, differentiates
between the influence brought to bear on "any juror" and that
brought to the attention of "the jury", an important distinction.
The DeMille court only considered the influence of "any
(one) juror" who may have persuaded others based upon her own
pre-deliberation experience.

It did not consider the en masse

prayer during deliberation nor, more importantly, the influence
of the authority of the "priesthood".
-6-

Furtherf the majority in DeMille surely would not have
come to the same conclusion if the majority of the jury would
have agreed, in advance, to base their verdict on defense counsels eye contact (as did the one) rather than the evidence, any
more than they would a verdict based upon a majority coin flip.
One juror's "coin flip" decision might be acceptable since seven
others' decisions are based upon the evidence; eight juror's
acceptance of the coin flip would never be acceptable; the line
between the two must be drawn somewhere in between.

When it is

clear that the final verdict resulted from the persuasive
intractability of six coin flippers, due process is not possible.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and as previously presented to this Court, this matter should be reversed and remanded
to the trial court for dismissal or new trial.
DATED this

/

^ day of August, 1988.

^£^t ~p, $Jj y/n Sc</£_
LOfll F. DeXAND"
Attorney for Appellant

™

SCOTT W. REED
Attorney for Appellant
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day of August, 1988,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage
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prepaid fully thereon, to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General
and Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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